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action.

Petitioner SIPC asserts that it is.

CA 6 implied a congressional intent to
private enforcement of the SIPC obligation
right to sue and be sued in its own name.
General has filed a memorandum on behalf of t

-

which he

and Exchange Commission, a named

6 ruling is erroneous but states

the SEC's experience with the Act is insufficient to

t~at

enable ~~~

it to express an opinion whether the error is sufficiently ~ ~~

important to the administration of the
grant of

Act ~war~

the

certiora ~ .
___./

2.

Facts:

The Security Investor Protection Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 78 aaa et

~·

_

was enacted to protect
customers
_____..

of securities brokers and dealers.

·--=------------ --------

The Act

r~flected

congressional fears that the certain brokers and dealers
might fail and thereby jeopardize the cash and securities
their customers had left in their charge.

The Act established

the Security Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a non-profit
corporation with a membership consisting of brokers, dealers,
and .members of the national exchanges.
In addition to consulting and counseling respon~ibilities,
the Act charges SIPC with the responsibility of acting to
save customer's assets in cases in which a member's insolvency
appears imminent.

Section 78 eee(a) (1) of the Act require s

that the Securities and Exchange Commission or any self-regulatory

3.

organization

1

report to SIPC whenever it believes that an

SIPC member is in financial difficulty or is approaching
that state.

The Act authorizes SIPC to seek a judicial

decree that the customers of its members are in need of the

-

Act's protection and empowers the court, upon a proper

-

finding, to app? int a

tr~

for liquidation of the member's

business and distribution of its assets.

See id. §78 eee(b). ·

Finally, if liquidation is ordered the Act provides that SIPC
must advance to the trustee sufficient sums to enable him
to satisfy customers' claims not exceeding $50,000.

Id.

§ 78 fff(f).

The Act vests initial responsibility for seeking
liquidation in the SIPC.

Upon a determination of the

e~istence of certain specified conditions and an SIPC finding

that the member "has failed or is in danger of failing to
meet its obligations to its customers" the SIPC "may"
commence liquidation proceedings.

This broad discretion

is limited by Section 78 ggg, which authorizes the Securities

1. Self-regulatory organizations presently include
the national securities exchanges and the National AsS'n.
of Securities Dealers.

I

"----'

4.

and Exchange Commission to apply to the district court
for an order requiring the SIPC to discharge its obligations
under the Act.
Respondent Barbour is the trustee for Guarantee Bond
and Securities Corporation (Guarantee Bond), a broker-dealer

------

registered with the SEC.

In December of 1970, only a few

days before the effective date of the Securities
Protection Act, the

SE~

Investor

filed a complaint alleging substantial

violations of the SEC net capital rule and requesting a
preliminary injunction against further violations.
Janu~ ry

In

of the following year, a few days after the effective

date of the Act, the district court found Guarantee Bond to
have been in violation of Commission rule and -issued a

/··------.---------

preliminary injunction against further violations.

..

-

On

motion of the SEC, the court appointed a receiver for
~

,-,

Guarantee
._.,., ,.,Bond
.., .
The appointed receiver, after having completed part
of the liquidation, filed a petition in the district court
asking that SIPC and the SEC be ordered to show cause why
the SIPC should not be required to extend the protections
of the Act to the customers of the insolvent firm.

The

court issued the requested order.
The district court concluded that it had in personam
and subject matter jurisdiction and that respondent had
standing to institute an action to compel the SIPC to discharge

5.

its statutory obligations in this case.

The Court concluded,

however, that application of the Act to this case would
amount to retroactive extension of an Act designed to apply
only prospectively.
CA 6 affirmed the district court's rulings on standing
and jurisdiction, but reversed the determination that the
Act could not be applied to the facts of this case.

While

conceding that applying the Act to bankruptcies occurring
prior to its ·effective date would violate the clear congressional
intent only to offer the Act's protections prospectively,
CA 6 concluded that the facts of this case indicated that
the Act should apply.

CA 6 noted that the SEC's initial
.,'ll...-;·

--

·~

.. ·•·

....

complaint against Guarantee Bond, which preceded

the

effective date of the Act, did not include a request that

----

Guarantee be forced into receivership.

--SEC action
..______

~

-

-----

Thus, the original

did not prevent Guarantee from operating and

conducting normal business after the effective date of the
Act.

In the opinion of CA 6, the conduct of business after

the effective date of the Act made Guarantee Bond a "broker"
within the meaning of the Act.

Thus, the customers of

Guarantee were covered by the SIPA.
3.

Contentions:

Although

~

for this Court's consideration, it only

raises five questions
arg~es

three.

The

remaining two are stated for the purpose of saving them in
(

6.

the event the writ is granted.

2

The first point raised and discussed is that CA 6
misconstrued Section 7(b) of SIPA when it determined that
it grants a P,rivate cause of action to compel SIPC to
discharge its

obl~gations

under the Act.

This is the point

that petitioner advances most forcefully.

.

Petitioner additionally asserts that the lower courts
erred in determining that SIPC should be compelled to
initiate liquidation proceedings under the Act in an
instance in which the broker-dealer already has been
substantially liquidated; where there is no demonstration
that the customers will suffer any loss; and where it is
impossible to implement the Act in the manner intended by
Congr~ss.

Petitioner's third major point is that the courts
erred in concluding that the Tennessee long arm statute
authorized the assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over the SIPC.

Petitioner asserts that this application

of the statute violates the due process "minimum contacts"
requirement established by a number of decisions of this

2. The points raised but not discussed are whether,
assuming a private right to action can be implied under the
stat~te, a Receiver in Bankruptcy has standing to protect
the ~nterests of the customers, and a retroactivity point that
a dealer hopelessly insolvent prior to the effective date of
the Act is not covered by its provisions.
As part of this
latter point, petitioner asserts that it was denied due process
when CA 6 held that the Act applies without requiring a: , · . ·
hearing on the evidentiary question of whether Guarantee conducted
normal business after the effective date of the Act.

7•

See~·~·,

Court.

Hanson v. Kenckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);

Intnl . . Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.

Petitioner indicates that its

sole offices are in Washington, D. C. and that it does not
engage in activities, substantial or otherwise in the forum
state.
4.

Discussion:

Standing alone, two of petitioners'

three major points are not certworthy.

The question of in

personam jurisdiction is largely a factual determination.
The district court ruling, affirmed without discussion by
CA 6, was that SIPC had established a continuing relationship
with members and customers in the State of Tennessee.

The

court concluded that the Act plainly provides that the SIPC
will impose assessments on members, collect those assessments
through a collection agent, and extend protection to customers
and members within the State.

That provided the continuing

relationship with the forum $tate.
3
not appear certworthy.

This determination does

1 c~~
__:..-...--

3. Respondent Barbour, the Receiver in Bankruptcy, has
asserted that petitioner waived objection to the Court's in
personam jurisdiction. That appears to represent a misinterpretation
of the record. The district court considered the request to require
SIPC to discharge its statutory obligations to be an ancillary
question to the administration of the receivership. This apparently
created some confusion about whether the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would apply. Petitioner, more concerned with other
matters, offered to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction
if the court would agree to conduct all proceedings in accordance
With the Federal Rules. Petitioner's offer, contained in its reply
brief, was clearly conditional in nature. Seen. 2 of Petitioner's
reply brief. More ~mportant, the offer was reject ed; the district
court ignored petitioner's conditional offer and considered the in
personam jurisdiction question on the merits. CA 6 affirmed on tEe
merits, not mentioning waiver.

·.:.

'

.'

·'

..
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Court~

See~·~·,

Hanson v. Kenckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);

Intnl . . Shoe, 326 U.S. 310.

Petitioner indicates that its

sole offices are in Washington, D. C. and that it does not
engage in activities, substantial or otherwise in the forum
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4.

Discussion:

Standing alone, two of petitioners'

three major points are not certworthy.

The question of in

personam jurisdiction is largely a factual determination.
The district court ruling, affirmed without discussion by
CA 6, was that SIPC had established a continuing relationship
with members and customers in the State of Tennessee.

The

court concluded that the Act plainly provides that the SIPC
will impose assessments on members, collect those assessments
through a collection agent, and extend protection to customers
and members within the State.

That provided the continuing

relationship with the forum state.
3
not appear certworthy.

This determination does

3. Respondent Barbour, the Receiver in Bankruptcy, has
asserted that petitioner waived objection to the Court's in
personam jurisdiction. That appears to represent a misinterpretation
of the record. The district court considered the request to require
SIPC to discharge its statutory obligations to be an ancillary
question to the administration of the receivership. This apparently
created some confusion about whether the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would apply. Petitioner, more concerned with other
matters, offered to submit itself to the court's jurisdiction
if the court would agree to conduct all proceedings in accordance
With the Federal Rules. Petitioner's offer, contained in its reply
brief, was clearly conditional in nature. Seen. 2 of Petitioner's
reply brief. More ~mportant, the offer was reject ed; the district
court ignored petitioner's conditional offer and considered the in
personam jurisdiction question on the merits. CA 6 affirmed on tne
merits, not mentioning waiver.

8.

Petitioner's point that application of the Act to a
liquidation that was substantially completed at the time
of interjection of the SIPC is an isolated ruling that is
not likely to have major importance to the adrninis.tration
of the Act.

Essentially, petitioner urges that the facts

of this case were such that the statutory purpose could not
be achieved by extending SIPC protection to these customers.
This point is not certworthy by itself.
The point most stressed by petitioner, that the Act
does not afford a private cause of action to compel SIPC
-

_!..!£@_ -

to discharge its statutory obligations, is an issue that
,--appears to have more significant implications to the .

-

-------------------

administration of the SIPA.

The Act specifies certain

'

conditions that SIPC must find before deciding to reque st
that a court decree that the member's customers are in
need of the Act's protections.

Even when the conditions are

satisfied, the Act vests discretion in SIPC to determine
whether to request that the court adjudicate the customers
in need of the Act's protections, and thus force liquidation.
The Act provides that the SIPC discretion can be policed
by the

SEC~

__.---..)

-

It affords the SEC the rightto override the

------

SIPC
judgment by bringing an injunction action to\ compel
'
the SIPC to commence a liquidation proceeding.
The A~us ·contemplates ~dual exercise of discretio~
First, the SIPC has discretion to decide whether to seek to

9.

have a court initiate a liquidation proceeding and extend
the protections of the Act to a broker-dealer's customers.
Second, assuming an SIPC decision not to extend coverage
in a given case,

th~t

provides the SEC the power to
The

Jj

SIPA is silent ·on the question of a private right of

V'~

initiate proceedings to ~ompel the SIPC to act.

action on this question.
The CA 6 decision that a private right o:E action does
exist to compel SIPC action rests on two factors:
~

(1) that

the Act recognizes that the SIPC can sue and be sued in its
own name; and (2) that the Act does not specifically prohibit
a private suit to compel SIPC action on this matter.
fa~tors

These

persuaded CA 6 that the Act should not be construed

to foreclose private litigation on the question of the SIPC's
discharge of its statutory obligation to customers in a
particular · instance.
Petitioner primarily relies on the recent decision
in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) to establish that the CA 6
statutory interpretation is erroneous.

In National RR

Passenger Corp. the Court refused to imply a general private
right of action in the Amtrak Act, concluding that the broad
provisions of the statute created a "public cause of action"
that could only be enforced by the Attorney General.

Id. at 457.

...

10.

National Passenger is largely a question of interpretation
of the Amtrack Act.

However, the case does indicate on a more

-

::::=

general level that courts should be reluctant to imply private
causes of action in some complex federal regulatory matters
where the existence of such an action would seriously disrupt
the balance between .the regulatee and the federal agency
charged with an oversight function.

The general structure

of the SIPA strongly suggests the correctness of the SIPC
assertion that the decision whether to force liquidation
and extend the Act's protections to a group of customers is
one committed to the pyramided discretions of the SIPC and
the SEC..

It is hard to deterrn.ine exactly how a private

cause of action would fit into this scheme.
The SG, on behalf of respondent SEC, has conceded
that CA 6 erred on this point.

The SG asserts, however,

that the Act is too new to enable him or the SEC to express
an opinion whether the error below is of sufficient importance
to merit the grant of certiorari.
The SG's timidity is somewhat surprising.

If followed

in other courts, the CA 6 ruling would appear to have significant
consequences on the overall administration of SIPA.

And, as

the SIPC has pointed out, the pres ent market situation is
sufficiently gloomy to suggest that actions of this kind might
recur with some frequency.
There are responses by both respondents and petitioner
has filed a reply.
September 18, 1974

Boyd
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BOBTAIL MEMO

JDUM

To: Justice Powell
From: David

Re: No.73-2055 Securities
Investor Protect1on Corp.
v. Barbour, et. al

In my view, this is a rather easy case.

I think that

a private cause of action is inconsistent with the framework
of the Securities Investor Protection Act.

I therefore recommend

that you vote to reverse the decision of the Sixth Circuit
authorizing such an action.

This disposition makes it unnecessary

to reach the standing issue on which certiorari also was
granted.
If nothing else, the law governing the question of
determining whether a private cause of action should be implied
is extremely pragmatic. As Justice Stewart wrote in National R.R .
Passenger Corp. v.
414

u.s.

National Association of Railroad Passengers,

453, 458 (1974):
[T]he inference of such a private cause of action
not otherwise authorized by the statute must be
consistent with the evident legislative intent
and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes
intended to be served by the Act.

Thus, the basic analysis required is a careful examination of
the statute allegedly sought to be enforced to determine whether
private enforcement via judicial action would serve to further
the legislative purpose in enacting the statute. Thus, for
example, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,377 U.S. 426, the opinion
generally considered to be the father of the notion of an implied
private cauae of action to enforce a regulatory statute, the

•...

2.

Court premised the implied cause of action on the determination
that such an action would provide a "necessary supplement" to
SEC action and that judicial provision of a private action would
afford a ''most effective weapon" for enforcing the Securities
and Exchange Act's proxy requirements. Id., at 432. In the
Amtrak case (National R.R. Passenger Corp.), on the other hand,
a determination that a private action would disrupt rather than
promote the Act's implementation dictated a conclusion that such
an action would not be provided.
In this case it appears that an implied private right of
action would be inconsistent with the careful balance of
discretion established by the relationship between the Securities
Investor Protection Corp. and the SEC.
noc contemplate

Obviously Congress did

that the protections of the Act would automatic-

ally be extended to every group of investors that might suffer
Losses resulting from insolvency of a member of the securities
industry.

Thus, the Act vests significant discretion in the

Securities Investor Protection Corporation, stating that
"[i]f SIPC determines"that the statutory conditions are satisfied
it "may apply •.• for a decree adjudicating that customers
of such member are in need of the protection provided by this
chapter." 15

u.s.c.

§

78ggg(b).

Moreover, the Act establishes

the SEC as the regulatory body responsible for assuring that
SIPC exercises its discretion in a responsible manner. Not only
does the Act provide that the SEC should inform SIPC of facts
indicating that a member is approaching financial difficulty,id.,
it authorizes the SEC to apply to the district court for a
decree requiring SIPC to extend the protections of the Act to

~

'

.

3.

cover a particular situation. Significantly, however, the
Act again vests discretion in the SEC, stating that "[i]n the
event of the refusal of SIPC to commit its funds or
otherwise to act for the protection of customers

... the

Commission may apply to the disttict court •••• "
Thus, the Act carefully con$tructs a two-tiered level
of discretionary authority,
substantial expertise.

vested·~ in

organizations possessing

Implication of a private cause of

action in individuals probably lacking that expertise seems
inconsistent with this scheme.

Decisions of whether to extend

the Act's protections in a given situation invariably will
require a rather sophistocated financial judgment.

Additiona~ly,

it would appear that "inside information" of the kind the
SEC and the SIPC might normally obtain through their capacities
as regulatory bodies would be important in reaching a decision.
Those organizations might, for example, know that a firm was
about to enter into a merger, obtain a significant 'financial
boost through loan or divestiture, or take any number of actions
to improve the financial picture.

Not only would premature

intervention be unnecessary, in some cases it might frustrate
the very ameliorative processes that are at work.

And allowing

a private party to institute suit and force SIPC to justify its
decision not to act might prove even more disasterous, requiring
in some instances that SIPC reveal sensitive information at
a critical time in order to justify its decision to the courts.
The other arguments are plentiful, and need not be
elaborated here. I think this is a clear case, and that the
decision below should be reversed.
David
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATiS
No. 73-2055

.&"/t/75-

Securities Investor Protection! On Writ of Certiorari to
Corporation, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Sixth
James C. Barbour Pt al.
Circuit.
[May -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE MARSHAL:&.. delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Securities Investor Protection Corporation
(SIPC) was established by Congress as a nonprofit membership corporation for the purpose, inter alia, of providing financial relief to the customers of failing brokerdealers with whom they had left cash or securities on
deposit. The question presented by this case is whether
such customers have an implied private right of action
under
e ecun Ies nvestor rotection Act of 1970
(SIPA), 1.5 U.S. C.§ 78aaa et seq., to compel SIPC to
exercise its statutory authority for their 5enefit.
-

-

I
Tn D{'cember 1970 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint in District Court against
Guaranty Bond and Secunties Corporation, a registered
broker-dealer, to enjoin continued violation of the Commis::~ion's net capital and other rules. On January 6,
1971, the District Court issued a preliminary inJunction,
and on January 29 it granted the Commission's motion
for appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of,
Guaranty Bond Respondent .James C. Barbour was
u.ppointfod receiver.

1

'

'7~

2

'
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On April 6 respondent. allegmg that customers of
Guaranty Bond would sustain a loss at least equal to the
costs of administering the receivership, obtained from
the court ao order directing the SEC and SIPC to show
cause "why the remedies afforded by the [SIPA] should
not be made available in this proceeding." In its answer
the SEC took the position that respondent had not
demonstrated that Guaranty's customers would in fact
sustain any loss since it appeared that the receiver would
have a cause of action for damages or restitution against
Guaranty's parent company and principals. .§!f.C, on
the other hand, challenged the receiver's standing to
maintain an action to compel its intervention and, in
direct opposition to the position of the SEC, argued that
Guaranty s insolvency pnor to the ecember 30, 1970,
rlate on which the SIPA too effect meant tliat application of the Act to this case would g1ve it an unlawful
retroactive effect.
The District Court upheld the receiver's right of action,
but demed relief on the ground that Guaranty's hopeless
insolvency pnor to the effective date of the SIP A rendered the Act inapplicable. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reversed. Since Guaranty had conducted 101 transactions after December 30, and the SEC
did not move to prevent its carrying on business as a
broker-dealer until January 6, It held that Guaranty
qualified as a broker-dealer on th~e
Act. ' he court en reJecte ~ G's argument that the
provision for SEC enforcement actwns to compel SIPC
to perform its functions was meant to be exclusive of
such actions by protected customers or their representative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. We
grauted certiorari, limited to the questions whether customers have an 1mplied right of action to compel SIPC
to act and , if RO, whether a receiver has standing to maintam 1t. - 1J. S.
(1974) . ~mce we now reverse
.

-...---~

~

)
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3

the Court of Appeals on the groun~ that no implied
:right of action exists, we do not ~qdress the second
question,
II
Following a period of great expansion in the 1960s, the
securities industry experienced a business contraction
that led to the failure or instability of a sigr).ificant nu.m~
ber of brokerage firms. Custom~r!S of fa.iled firms found
their ca,sh and securities on deposit, either disslpA-ted or
tied up in lengthy bankruptcy pfOCE:Jedings. In addition
to its disastrous effects on customer assets and investor
confidence, this situation also threatened a ''domino effect" trvolving otherwise solvent brokers that had sub~
stantial open tqwsactions with firms that failed. Congress enacted the SIPA to arnest this process, restore
investor confidence in the capita,J rp.arkets, ~nd upgrade
the financial responsibility requirem~nts for registered
brokers and dea1ers. S. Rep, No, 91-1218 1 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 2-4 (1970); H. R: Rep. No. 91-.l613, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 2-4 ( 1970),
The Act apportions responsibility for these tasks
a.mong the SEC, the securities inqustry self-regula,tory
organizations, aqd SIPC, a nonprofit, private membership
co.rpo~ti_~~ to whic1i most registeted brokers and dealers
are required to belong. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc. Most im~
portant for present purposes, thf:l .A.ct creates a new form
of liquidation proceeding, applicable only t~r
1
fi~plish the c~mpletion of open
transactions and the speedy return of most customer
property,
To this end, SIPC is required to establish and maintain a fund for cu tomer protection byTaying assessm~ts
on tlie annual gross revenues of its members. The SEC
and the securities mdustry self-reg~latory organizations
a.re required to notify HIPC whenever it appears that a
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member is in or ~pproaching· fin~ncial difficulty. If
SIPC determines that a member has failed or is in qanger
of failing to meet its obligations to customers, and fi.I1ds
any one of five srecified conditions suggestive of fin!lncial
irrespons~bility, tl'ten i~ '(may apply to any court of com~
petent jurisdiction . . . for a 4ecree adjuclicating that
customers of such member t=~.re in neeq qf the protectiou
provided by [th~ Act]." 15 U. S. C. § 78eee (:2).
The mere filing of an SIPC a}:lplipatjon giyes the court
in wqich it is filed exclusive jurisdiction over tpe member
and it~ property, wherever located, 11nd q~quires the court
to stay "any pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure,
equity receivership, or other proceeding to reorganize,
conserve, or liquidate the fmemper] or its property and
any other suit against any receiver, conservator, or
trustee of the [member] or its property." 15 U. S. C.
§ 78eee (b) (2). · If the S.EC has pending any action
against the member, it ma.y, with the Commi~sion's consent, be combined with the SIPC prqceeqing. If no such
action is pending, the S.EC may intervene as a party to
the SIPC proceeding.
If the court finds any of the five conditions on which
a SIPC applica.tion may be based, it must grant the application and issue the decree, and ,appoint as trustee for
the liquidation of the business imd as attorney for the
trustee, "such per~>ons as SIPC shall specify.'' 1.5 U.S. C"
§ 78eee (b)(l), (3) .
The trustee is empowered and directed by the Act to
return customer property, complete open tra11sactions,
enforce rights of !iJUbrogation, and liquidate tqe business
of the member, 15 U. S. C. § 78fff (a); he lS not empowered to reorganize or rehabilita te the business. SIPC
is required to advance to him such sums as are necessary
to complete open transactwns, and to accomplish the
return of customer property up to a value of $50,000.
ld" ~ 78fff (f).
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'rhe role
of the SEC m this scheme, insofar as relevant \
~
to the present case, is one of "plenary authority" to
supervise SIPC. S. Rep., supra, at 1; see H. R. Rep,
supra, at 12. For example, it may disapprove in whole
or in part any bylaw or rule adopted by the Board of
Directors of SIPC, or require th~ adoption of any rule
it deems appropriate, in order to promote the public
interest and the purposes of the Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc
(e). It may inspect and examine SIPC's records and
require that any information it de~ms appropriate be
furnished to it, and it receives the corporation's annual
report for inspection and transmission, with 1ts comments, to the President and Congress. 15 U. S. C.
§ 78ggg (c). It may participate in any liquidation proceeding initiated by SIPC, but even more important,
§ 7 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78ggg (b), provides:
"Enforcement of actions.-In the event of the refusal of SIPC to commit its funds or otherwise to
act for the protectiOn of customers of any member
of SIPC, the Commission may apply to the district
court of the United States in which the principal
office of SIPC is located for an order requiring SIPC
to discharge its obligations under [the Act] and for
such other relief as the court may deem appropriate
to carry out the purpo:,;es of [the Act J ."

It is against this background relationship between
SIPC and the SEC that we must approach the question
whether, in addition to the Commission, a member's
cll'Stomers or their rerresentative--miiY seek m District
(~ "to commit its funds or otherwise
to act for the protection' of such customers.
~

III
The respoudent contends that since the SIPA does not
in terms preclude a private cause of action at the
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instance of a member broker's customers, and since such
customers are the mtended beneficiaries of the Act, the
Court should imply a right of action by which customers
can compel SIPC to discharge 1ts oblig~tions to them.
As we said only htst Term in analyzing a similar contention, "It goes without saymg . .. thltt the inference of
such a private cf).use of action not otherwise authorized
by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative inteut anq, of course, with the effectuation of the
purposes mtended to be served by the Act.'' National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974) (hereinafter
Arntrak).
In Arntrak itself t.he petitioner was a corporatio11
created by Congress to assume from private railroads
certain intercity rail passenger service responsibilities.
The respondent passenger association brought an action
to enjoin the discontinuance ' of a particular service as
announced by the corporation pursuant to its authority
under the Rail Passenger Service (Amtrak) Act, 45
U. S. C. § 564 (b)(2). That Act made express provision
for suits against Amtrak to enforce its duties and obligations only "upon petition of the Attorney General of
the J]nited States or, in a case involving a labor agreemf'nt, upon petition of any employee affected" by the
agreement. 45 U. S. C. ~ o47 (a) . There, as here, the
plaintiff~respondent argued that statutory authorization
for one type of uction agam st the congressionally created
corporation did not preclude another at the instance of
the intended beneficiaries of the law.
The Court's analysis of the claim in Arntrak bega,n
w1th the observation that express statutory provision for
one form of proceeding ordinarily implies that no other
means of enforcement was mtended by the legislature.
That unplicat1on would yield , however, to "clear
contrary
________..
'
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evidence of legislative intent," for which we turned to
t he legislative history and the overall structure of the
Amtrak Act.
Inspection revealed that the legislative history of the
Amtrak Act was entirely consonant with the impl~cation
of the statutory language that no private right of action
was intended. 1 The general strructure and pUrpose of
the Act, gave further support to that conclusion. Congress pad expected that, in preating an ~conomically viable rail passenger system, some rail service would have
to be 'discontinued by Amtrak; it had provided an efficient and expeditious means to that end, whi~h seemed
incompatiple with an intent to al~ow a private action by
any passenger affected by a discontinuance 'decision.2
Nor would the absence of a private right of action leave
Amtrak free to disregard the public interest in its decisionmaking. In addition to mvcsting the Attorney
General with "authority to police the Amtrak system
and to enforce the various duties and obligations imposed
by the Act" by court action, Congress provided for "substantial scrutiny" over Amtrak's operations by requiring
lt to make periodic reports to Congress and the President
and to open its ' books to th~ Compt roller General for
auditing. 414 U. S., at 464"
1 Both the Secretary of Tran::,portation, who was given primj.. ~
responsibihty for implementmg the law, and spokesmen for orga,.
nized labor had interpreted the bJIJ at; rnac~to precludf' privat\"
actiOns other than tho~e spPcificully authonzed. The drafting sub·
committee to which the~e v1ews had been exprPssed found nothing
in thf'm to correct
z See 414 U S, aL 462·
' lL how<>vf'r, [the Act] werr tO b..• interpreted as permitting private
lawsmts to prevent the d1srontinuance of pas~>enger trams, thrn the
on!) effect of the Act m tlu<' rt'gard would have been to subst1tute
the federal dist rict courts for thr ;;tate or federal 11dministrahve
llodJe:-; formerly reqmred to pa~s upon p,roposed discontinuance!l."'

..
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The similarities between the present case and Amtrak
are undeniable and for the respondent, we think, insur~
mountable. As with Amtrak, so with SIPC, Congress
has created a corporate entity to solve a public problem;
it has providf'd for substantial supervision of it.s opera..
tious by an agency charged with protection of the public
interest-here th~ SEC--and for enforcement by that
agency in court of the obligatiOns imposed upon the
corporatwn. The corporation is required to report to
Congress and the President, and to open its books and
records to the SEC and the Comptroller General. Further, Congress has chartered SIPC, unlike Amtrak, as a
nonproilt corporation, and it has put its direction in the
hands of a publicly chm·en board of directors.
Beyond the inference to be drawn from the structure
of SIPC, there is no extrinsic evidence that Congress intended to allow an action such as that before us. 3 As
the respondent concedes, there 1s no indication in the
legislative history of the SIPA that Congress ever contemplated a private nght of actwn parallel to that expressly given to the SEC. Additionally, as in Amtrak, it
is clear that the overall structurf' and purpose of the
s Re&pondent argut>S that lweau~f' Congres& provided that SIPC
can "sue and be sued, complain and defend, in 1ts corporate name
und through it;; own counsel m an~ court, State, or Federal," 15
U. S. C. § 78ccc (b) (1), it must llavP contemplated occaswns when
f\11 aggrieved customer of a member firm would be able to sue. In
light of the spemfic terms of the more releYant section governmg
~uits to compel SIPC to act for thP benefit of mvestors, that con·
elusion 1,; unwarranted. It it:- also tncompat1ble with the hm1tation
of SEC action;:; "lo thE> di~tr~et comt of thP United States in which
the prmCJpnl office of SIPC 1~ locatl•d" 15 tT 8 C § 78ggg (b) It
would be anomalous for Congress to have centralized SEC ~nits for·
t w apparent convemf'nc< of SIPC wh!l<• exposing the corporatiOn to
">llb~ttmtJvely Identic;.~! ;;tutc hy tllWl<tor~ "m any court, State <J!"

f"det.1iL"

l
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SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied
right.
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and
creating SIPC wa.s, of course, the protection of investors.
It does not follow, however, that an implied right of
action by investors who deem themselves to be in need
of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed
capable of furthering that purpose.
SIPC properly treats an application for the appointment of a receiver and liquidation of a brokerage :firm
as a last resort. It maintains an early warning system
and monitors the affairs of any firm that it is given
reason to believe may be in danger of failure. Its experience to date demonstrates that more often than not
an endangered firm will avoid collapse by infusion of
new capital or merger with a stronger firm! Even failing those alternatives, a firm may be able to liquidate
under the supervision of one of the self-regulatory organizations, or the District Court, without danger of loss
to customers. SIPC's policy, therefore, is to defer intervention "until there appear[s] to be no reasonable doubt
that customers would need the protection of the Act."
SIPC 1973 Annual Report 7 (1974). By this policy;
SIPC avoids unnecessarily engendering the costs of precipitious liquidations-the costs not only of administering t.he liquidation, but also of customer illiquidity and
additional loss of confidence in the capital mll-rkets-without sacrifice of any customer protection that may
Of the 266 finn~ bro,tght to the attention of the SIPC by the
rxchanges, self-regulatory organizatiOns, and the SEC between the
Pff<'ctlw date o; the SIP-\. and the end of 1973, only 32 were o;ubjt·rted to SIPC liquidatum a.s of December 31, 1973. Sixty-six
withdrew from the bu~mes~ of carrying customer accounts, 26 selfliquidated and 20 became mactive without cu~tomer loss, 11 merged
with other firms, 62 corrected thrir problems, and 49 remained under
:-;•trVPillancr SIPC 1973 Annual Report. 17.
1
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ultimately prove necessary. A customer, by contrast,
cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate infor~
mation to consider. these public interests in timing his
decision to apply to the courts.
The respondent in this case does not, of course, claim
any right to make the dflcision that a firm should be
liquidated; the Act makes that a judicial decision. He
seeks only the right to ask the District Court to make
that decision when both SIPC and the SEC have refused
or simply failed to do so. In practical effect, however,
the difference is slight. Except with respect to the solidest of houses, the mere filing of an action predicated
upon allegations of financial insecurity might often prove
fatal.~ Other customers could not be expected to leave
their cash and ~ecurities on deposit, nor other brokers
to initiate new transactions that the firm might not be
able to cover when due if a receiver is appointed, nor
would suppliers be likely to continue dealing with such
a firm . These consequences are too grave, and when
unnecessary, too inimical to the purposes of the Act, for
the Court to impute to Congress an intent to grant to
every member of the mvestin., public control over their
occurrence.
n t e contrary, t ey seem to be the very
sorts J considerations that motivated Congress to put
SIPC in the hands of a public board of directors. responc:

---..-"(

.:~ SC:'e Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 897
(1907) : "ThC:' mom<'nt you brmg a pubhc proceeding again~t a
broker-deal<>r who depends UIJO!I confidence in his reputation, he is
to all mtents and purposes out of business." See ~ources collected
at Freeman, Summary Action b) Admirn~trative Agencies, 40 U.
Chi. L. Rev 1, 33 n . 162 (1972) , and Gellhorn, Adver& Publicity
by Admimstratwe Agenc1es, 86 Harv L. Rev. 1380 1394-1397
(1973) . There may, of cour~e, be less rea$on for public reaction t,o
t private, as opposf'd to SEC, smt to compel SIPC's protectivemeasures, but there 1:,; little reason to think that the investing publie~ with itt< n~sels at risk, would lw interested iu the distiuct.wn.
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sible to an agency experienced in regulation of the securi~
ties markets.~
We need not pause long over the distinctions between
this case and those, such as J I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U. S. 426 (1964), and Allen v Board of Elect?:ons, 393
U. S. 544 (1969), in which the Court held that an im~
plied private cause of actwu was maintainable.
In J. I. Case a stockholder sought damages against his
corporation for its alleged misrepresentations, violative
of § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in
soliciting proxy votes for the approval of a merger. In
light of the "broad remedial pm:poses" of the Act and
the SEC's representation that private enforcement was
·necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the Court
held that the action for damages could be maintained.
ThE' Court first concluded that it was "clear that private parties have a right under § 27 [of the Act] to bring
suit for violation of § 14 (a)," since § 27 specifically
granted the district courts jurisdiction oyer "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created" under the Act. 377 U. S., at 431. The
more difficult question was whether the private parties,
oncfJ in court, could seek damages as well as equitable
relief. On this point, the Court agreed with the SEC
that private enforcement of the proxy rules was a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement. Since there wag
6 The ~equence of events giving rise to this case provided no
opportnmty for a run on Guaranty because the attempt to compel
SIPC's interventiOn occurred after the firm had ceased doing business and come within the jumdiction of thP D1stnct Court for liqui~
dation, at. the in~tance of the SEC.. In these limited circumstances
Congre~~ cottld n·asonably 1mvt provider! for a private action by
a rereivPr againHt RIPC, bnt It <hd not and we are not at liberty
to do so There 1s, after <Ill, a real d1fierence between a comt,'s
:implymg a nght of action to efieetuatr the purpo:st:'S of a ~tatutt!
:111d it~ cutting a code of procedure nul of whole c).otlhl,
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no contrary indicatiou from Congress. the Court so held,
relying on the statement from Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S.
678, 684 (1946), that "where legal rigpts have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right
to sue for such invasion. federal courts may use any
available remedy to make gpod the wrol1g done.''
Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the S1PA contains
no standards of conduet that a private action could help
to enforee, and 1t contams no general grant of .iurisdietion to the district courts. As in Amtrak, 'a private right
of actwn under the Act would be consistent neither with
the legislative intent, nor with the effectuation of the
purposes it is intended to serve.
The Allen case arose under the Voting Rights Act of
1965. The question there was whether a private citizen
could sue to set aside a state or local election law on the
ground of its repugnancy to the Act. The federal statute
provided that the Attorney General may bring such suits,
but was silent as to the rights of others. It was clear
to the Court--itnd to the Attorney General-that the
Act would be practically unenforceable against the many
local governments sub:1ect to its strictures if only the
Attorney General were authorized to sue. We thus found
it "consistent w1th the broad purpose of the Act to allow
the individual citizen standing to insure that his mty or
county government complies with~' its requirements.
393 U. S., at 557"
There is not the shghtest reason to think that the
SIP A, in contrast to the Votmg Rights Act, imposes such
burdens on the parties charged with its administration
that Congress must either have mtended their efforts to
be supplemented by those of private investors or enacted
a statute incapable of achieving its purpose. Instead of'
enhsting the aid of mvestors Ill achieving that purpose,
Congress impQsed upon the SEC, the exchange and the
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self-regulatory organizations the obligation to report to
SIPC any situatiOn that might call for its intervention,
For these rf'asons we are unable to agree with the
propositiOn that the customers of a member broker ma.y
sue to compel SIPC to perform its statutory fu:hctions.7
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed , and
the case is remanded to the District Cour( with instructions that it be dismissed,
It is so ordered.

'The SIDC Rnggests iu it~ brief that u. detem1ination by it not
io proce!'d againHt SIPC w1th re~pH·t to a member broker-deale~·
who~e eu;;tomel'8

hnvr incmred a lo~'' of the type against which the
nugh1 be rl'viewable undet the Admini.strativt~
Proc1:dnrr- Act. for an abuse of rliserehou
We need express oo
opm1Ctn on that m~rttr•r toru1y.
~IPA 1~ d1rectrrl
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